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Abstract
Most popular blockchain solutions, like Bitcoin, rely on proof-of-work, guaranteeing that the output of the consensus is
agreed upon with high probability. However, this probability depends on the delivery of messages and that the computa-
tional power of the system is sufficiently scattered among pools of nodes in the network so that no pool can mine more blocks
faster than the crowd. New approaches, like Ethereum, generalise the proof-of-work approach by letting individuals deploy
their own private blockchain with high transaction throughput. As companies are starting to deploy private chains, it has
become crucial to better understand the guarantees blockchains offer in such a small and controlled environment.
In this paper, we present the Blockchain Anomaly, an execution that we experienced when building our private chain
at NICTA/Data61. Even though this anomaly has never been acknowledged before, it may translate into dramatic conse-
quences for the user of blockchains. Named after the infamous Paxos anomaly, this anomaly makes dependent transactions,
like “Bob sends money to Carole after he received money from Alice” impossible. This anomaly relies on the fact that exist-
ing blockchains do not ensure consensus safety deterministically: there is no way for Bob to make sure that Alice actually
sent him coins without Bob using an external mechanism, like converting these coins into a fiat currency that allows him
to withdraw. We also explore smart contracts as a potential alternative to transactions in order to freeze coins, and show
implementations of smart contract that can suffer from the Blockchain anomaly and others that may cope with it.
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1 Introduction
Mainstream public blockchain systems, like Bitcoin [16] and
Ethereum [20], require to reach consensus on Internet de-
spite the presence of malicious participants. Yet, it is impos-
sible for a distributed system including a faulty participant
to reach consensus if messages may not be delivered within
a bounded time [11]. This contradiction raises interesting re-
search questions regarding the formal properties that are sac-
rificed in these blockchain systems. Foundational consensus
algorithms [7] were proposed to never reach a decision in
case of arbitrary message delays, but to respond only cor-
rectly if ever. Surprisingly, these blockchain systems adopt a
different approach, sometimes responding incorrectly. These
few last years, the concept of private chain gained traction for
its ability to offer blockchain among multiple companies in a
private, controlled environment. Three months ago, eleven
banks collaborated successfully in deploying an Ethereum
private chain to perform transactions across North America,
Europe and Asia.1 To understand the limitations of consen-
sus and its potential consequences in the context of private
chains, we deployed our own private chain and stress-tested
the systems in corner-case situations.
In this paper, we present the Blockchain anomaly, a new
problem named after the Paxos anomaly [14, 1, 2, 13], that
prevents Bob from executing a transaction based on the cur-
rent state of the blockchain. In particular, we identified a
complex scenario where the agreement on the state of the
blockchain is not sufficient to guarantee immutability of the
chain. This anomaly can lead to dramatic consequences, like
the loss of virtual assets or a double-spending attack. We
also show that some smart contracts, expressive code snip-
pets that help defining how virtual assets can be owned and
exchanged in the system, may suffer from the Blockchain
anomaly. Our results outline the risk of using a blockchain in
a private context without understanding its complex design
features. We terminate our experience report by providing
the source code of a more complex smart contract that can
circumvent a particular example of the Blockchain anomaly.
Most blockchain systems track a transaction by includ-
ing it in a block that gets mined before being appended to
the chain of existing blocks, hence called blockchain. The con-
sensus algorithm guarantees a total order on these blocks,
so that the chain does not end up being a tree. This pro-
cess is actually executed speculatively in that multiple new
blocks can be appended transiently to the last block of the
chain—a transient branching process known as a fork. Once
the fork is discovered, meaning that the participants learn
about the two branches, the longest branch is adopted as the
valid one. Blockchain systems usually assume that forks can
grow up to some limited depth, as extending a branch re-
quires to solve a complex challenge that boils down to spend-
ing a long time during which one gets likely notified of the
longest chain. Bitcoin recommends six blocks to be mined
1BMO Financial Group, Credit Suisse, CBA, HSBC, Natixis, Royal
Bank of Scotland, TD Bank, UBS, UniCredit and Wells Fargo as ex-
plained at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/r3-connects-11-banks-
distributed-ledger-using-ethereum-microsoft-azure-
1539044.
after a transaction is issued to consider the transaction ac-
cepted by the system. Similarly, Ethereum states that five to
eleven more blocks should be appended after a block for it
to be accepted [20].
However, consensus cannot be solved in the general case.
In particular, foundational results of distributed comput-
ing indicate that consensus cannot be reached if there is no
upper-bound on the time for a message to be delivered and
if some participant may fail [11]. Consensus is usually ex-
pressed with three properties: agreement indicating that if
two non-faulty participants decide they decide on the same
block, validity indicating that the decided block should be
one of the blocks that were proposed and termination in-
dicating that eventually a correct participant decides. The
common decision that is taken by famous consensus pro-
tocols, like Paxos [15] and Raft [17], is to make sure that if
the messages get delayed, at least validity and agreement
remain ensured. This is achieved by having the algorithm
doing nothing in the worst case, hence sacrificing termina-
tion to ensure that only correct responses—satisfying both
validity and agreement—can be returned. These consensus
algorithms are appealing, because if after some time the net-
work stabilises and messages get delivered in a bounded
time, then consensus is reached [7].
We illustrate the Blockchain anomaly and describe a dis-
tributed execution where even committed transactions of a
private chain get reordered so that the latest transaction ends
up being committed first. We chose Ethereum for our experi-
ments as it is a mainstream blockchain system that allows the
deployment of private chains. We show how to reproduce
the Blockchain anomaly by following the same execution,
where messages get delayed between machines while some
miner mines new blocks. Despite transactions being already
committed the eventual delivery of messages produces a re-
organisation reordering some of the committed transactions.
In our execution, miners are setup to dedicate different num-
ber of cores to the mining process, hence mining at different
speeds. We argue that the misconfiguration of a machine
and the heterogeneous mining capabilities of machines be-
longing to different companies are sufficiently realistic to al-
low an attacker to execute a double-spending attack. Finally,
we discuss the relations of the Blockchain anomaly to other
problems and observe that it is not confined to the Ethereum
blockchain but could potentially apply to proof-of-stake pri-
vate blockchains as well, requiring further investigations.
Section 2 overviews the blockchain technology, the Paxos
anomaly and defines the important terms of the paper. In
Section 3, we present the blockchain anomaly. In Section 4,
we present our experiments based on an Ethereum private
chain. In Section 5, we explain how replacing transactions by
smart contracts could help bypassing the anomaly. Section 6
discusses the Blockchain anomaly in other settings. Section 7
presents the related work. And Section 8 concludes.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the key concepts of Bitcoin and
Ethereum consensus protocols, the condition of their termi-
nation and the Paxos anomaly before presenting the general
model.
2.1 Blockchain Systems
A blockchain can be considered as a replicated state ma-
chine [22] where a reversed link between blocks is a pointer
from a state to its preceding state as depicted in Figure 1.
Consensus is necessary to totally order the blocks, hence
maintaining the chain structure. To reach consensus despite
arbitrary failures, including malicious behaviors, traditional
blockchain systems adopted a technique based on proof-
of-work, requiring a proof of computation [8]. Specialised
peers, called miners, provably solve a hashcash crypto puz-
zle [3] before a new block can be appended to the blockchain.
Given a block and a threshold, a miner repeatedly selects a
nonce and applies a pseudo-random function to this block
and the selected nonce until it obtains a result lower than the
threshold. The difficulty of this work limits the rate at which
new blocks can be generated by the network.
2.2 From Nakamoto’s Consensus to Smart Con-
tracts
Nakamoto’s consensus [16] is at the core of Bitcoin, the
mainstream decentralised digital currency. Interestingly,
Nakamoto’s consensus does not guarantee agreement deter-
ministically. Instead it guarantees that agreement is met with
some probability close to 1. The difficulty of the crypto puz-
zles used in Bitcoin leads to mining a block every 10 min-
utes. The advantage of this long period, is that it is relatively
rare for the blockchain to fork due to blocks being simultane-
ously mined and Bitcoin resolves these forks by choosing the
longest branch and discarding the other(s).
Ethereum [21] is a recent open source cryptocurrency
platform that also builds upon proof-of-work. As opposed to
Bitcoin’s consensus protocol, Ethereum generates one block
every 12–15 seconds. While it improves the throughput
(transactions per second) it also favours transient forks as
miners are more likely to propose new blocks simultane-
ously. To avoid frequently wasting mining efforts to resolve
forks, Ethereum uses the GHOST (Greedy Heaviest Observed
Subtree) protocol that does not necessarily discards all the,
so called uncle, blocks of non selected branches. Ethereum
offers a Turing-complete programming language that can be
used to write smart contracts [18] that define new ownership
rules.
2.3 Termination of Consensus
By relaxing the agreement property of consensus, blockchain
systems can guarantee termination deterministically. In the
context of blockchain, termination of consensus indicates
0 1 i i+1
i+k
i+k-1
genesis block decided block undecided block
blockchain depth = i+k
Figure 1: The blockchain structure starts with a genesis
block at index 0 and links successive blocks in reverse order
of their index; a new block is decided at index i > 0 when
the blockchain depth reaches i + k (note that a blockchain of
depth 0 is a genesis block)
that a block has been decided for the next available block in-
dex. We say that all the transactions of a decided block are
committed.2 This decision upon a block inclusion in the chain
is necessary for cryptocurrency exchange platforms, for ex-
ample, to determine that coins of a particular type that are
newly minted3 within this block can be converted into alt-
coins (coins of a different type) or fiat currencies (e.g., EUR,
USD). In particular, observing that a block was mined and
appended to the chain is not sufficient to guarantee that it is
decided: this block could be part of one branch of a transient
fork without consensus being reached yet on any of these
branches.
Figure 1 depicts the termination of consensus on the in-
dex i of a blockchain. An arrow pointing from left to right in-
dicates that a block contains a hash of its predecessor block,
the one located immediately on its left. Newly mined blocks
are added to the right end of the blockchain that may fork
transiently if multiple blocks referring to the same prede-
cessor get mined concurrently. Forks are only transient and
their resolution depends on the blockchain system in use.
The consensus for an index i terminates when participants
decide on the new block to be assigned at index i. The de-
cision upon the block at index i occurs for all i > 0 when
the blockchain depth reaches i + k, where k ≥ 0 is a constant
dependent on the Blockchain system.
Different blockchain systems adopt different values of
k to define termination. In Bitcoin (btc), kbtc = 5, mean-
ing that the block at index i is decided—consensus for in-
dex i terminates—when the kbtc + 1 = 6 blocks at indices
i, ..., i + 5 have been successfully mined. As we previously
mentioned, a new block is decided every 10 minutes in Bit-
coin, hence it takes (kbtc + 1) ∗ 10 min = 1 hour for a trans-
action to be committed in Bitcoin. In Ethereum (eth) since
verion 1.3.5 Homestead, keth = 11, meaning that the block
at index i is decided—consensus for index i terminates—
when the blockchain depth reaches i + 11. Hence it takes
2Here, we use the term “committed” rather than “confirmed” as, in the
blockchain terminology, a transaction is meant to be “confirmed” sometimes
when only its block is mined, and sometimes when k + 1 blocks get mined
(its own block and the k successor blocks).
3As opposed to mining that includes the computation of the miners, mint-
ing consists simply of the creation of coins.
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ti ti’
time
index i
index j
1. ti and tj are proposed
2. ti’ and tj’ are proposed
3. ti’ and tj are committed
tj tj’
ti’
tj
Figure 2: The Paxos anomaly: a first leader proposes ti and
tj for slots i and j > i (with tj being implicitly conditional to
the commit of ti), a second leader proposes t′i and t
′
j while a
third leader commits t′i and tj for slots i and j, respectively,
hence violating the dependency between ti and tj
(keth + 1) ∗ 15 sec = 3 min for transactions to be commit-
ted in Ethereum. Note that some cryptocurrency exchange
platforms adopt different values of k to adjust the probabil-
ity of agreement, hence QuadrigaCX Ether Trading waits for
k′btc + 1 = 4 blocks to be mined in the Bitcoin blockchain
while it waits for keth + 1 = 12 blocks to be mined in the
Ethereum blockchain.4
2.4 The Paxos Anomaly
Paxos is a famous consensus protocol originally guarantee-
ing agreement and validity despite crash failures [15]. The
Paxos anomaly [1, 14] stems from the difficulty of implement-
ing conditional requests (or transactions) in Paxos: Paxos de-
cides on individual proposed transactions, potentially violat-
ing dependencies between transactions even when proposed
by the same requester as depicted in Figure 2 where a slot can
be viewed as the index of the decision. These dependencies
can be useful to make the execution of a transaction tj depen-
dent on the successful execution of a previous transaction ti:
for example if Bob wants to transfer an amount of money to
Carole (tj) only if he successfully received some money from
Alice (ti). In centralised systems, this anomaly can be eas-
ily avoided by enforcing an ordering on these transactions
by simply forwarding all requests to a primary node or co-
ordinator [14]. In Paxos as in fully decentralised systems,
however, the first transaction may not be decided in favour
of another proposed transaction in a first consensus instance
while in a subsequent consensus instance the second trans-
action may be successfully decided. This results in a viola-
tion of the condition that the second transaction should be
decided only if the first transaction was decided.
Below we present the Blockchain anomaly due to the de-
centralised aspects of blockchain systems, like Bitcoin and
Ethereum. The Blockchain anomaly shares similarities with
the Paxos anomaly, except that it can occur when transac-
tions, issued by different nodes of the system, are not even
concurrent.
4https://www.quadrigacx.com/faq.
2.5 General Model
We consider a distributed blockchain system of n peers
where peers can exchange coins from one to another through
transactions. The goal is for the system to implement a ledger
abstraction as a public permanent and auditable records of
all transactions. The ledger is implemented with a blockchain,
a series of transaction blocks, starting with a special block
called the genesis block. Blocks are singly linked one after an-
other up to the genesis block—each non-genesis block con-
taining a hash of the previously accepted block—and define
the current state of the ledger as the set of transactions that
ever occurred. The block index or slot increases monotoni-
cally from the index 0 of the genesis block.
Peers can fail arbitrarily, they can stop working and
can be malicious. Any peer can issue transactions that get
recorded into the transaction pool. Only miners can bundle a
subset of the pool of transactions into a block after ensuring
that there are sufficient funds available on the accounts of the
ledger and that these transactions do not conflict. The system
uses consensus to guarantee that no malicious peers are try-
ing to double-spend some coins by issuing two conflicting
transactions concurrently to different miners. To this end,
we consider a consensus protocol based on proof-of-work
so that miners bundle transactions from the transaction pool
into a block by solving a crypto puzzle in exchange of coins
for the system to decide on the new block. The difficulty of
the crypto puzzle determines the rate at which new blocks
can be mined: the higher the difficulty, the slower the rate.
At times though the blockchain may fork transiently5,
indicating that multiple blocks were appended to a unique
block, in which case conflicting transactions could poten-
tially be part of blocks on different branches of the chain.
If this fork happens, then a reorganisation process eventually
occurs to resolve the fork by uniquely identifying one of the
two branches as the right one.
3 The Blockchain Anomaly
We present the Blockchain anomaly, an anomaly that affects
mainstream blockchain systems whose consensus protocol
does not ensures agreement deterministically.
3.1 Causes of the Blockchain Anomaly
The problem stems from the asynchrony of the network, in
which message delays cannot be bounded, and the termina-
tion of consensus. Although two miners mine on the same
chain starting from the same genesis block, a long enough
delay in messages between them could lead to having the
miners seemingly agree separately on different branches
containing more than k blocks each, for any k. This anomaly
is dramatic as it can lead to simple attacks within any private
network where users have an incentive to maximise their
profits—in terms of coins, stock options or arbitrary own-
ership. Moreover, this scenario is realistic in the context of
5This transient forks are sometimes referred to as ephemeral forks as they
are expected in the normal course of the execution.
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time
index i
index j
ti tj
1. ti is proposed 2. ti appears committed 4. tj is committed first
3. tj is proposed by another node
Figure 3: The Blockchain anomaly: a first client issues ti that
gets successfully mined and committed then a second client
issues tj, with tj being conditional to the commit of ti (note
that j ≥ i + k for ti to be committed before tj gets issued),
but the transaction tj gets finally reorganised and
successfully committed before ti, hence violating the
dependency between ti and tj
private chain where the employees of a company, like NIC-
TA/Data61, have direct access to some of the network re-
sources. When messages get finally delivered, the results of
the disagreement creates inconsistencies.
3.2 Uncommitting Transactions
Figure 3 depicts the Blockchain anomaly, where a transaction
ti gets committed as part of slot i from the standpoint of some
nodes. Based on this observation, one proposes a new trans-
action tj knowing that ti was successfully committed. Again,
one can imagine a simple scenario where “Bob transfers an
amount of money to Carole” (tj) only if “Bob had success-
fully received some money from Alice” (ti) before. However,
once these nodes get notified of another branch of committed
transactions, they decide to reorganise the branch to resolve
the fork. The reorganisation removes the committed trans-
action ti from slot i. Later, the transaction tj is successfully
committed in slot i.
The anomaly stems from the violation of the dependency
between tj and ti: tj occurred meaning that Bob has trans-
ferred an amount of money to Carole, however, ti did not
occur meaning that Bob did not receive money from Alice.
Note that in Bitcoin, transaction ti gets discarded whereas in
Ethereum transaction ti may in some cases be committed in
slot j.
3.3 Facilitating a Double-Spending Attack
One dramatic consequence of the Blockchain anomaly is the
possibility for an attacker to execute a double-spending attack:
converting, for example, all his coins into goods twice. The
scenario consists of the attacker issuing a first transaction t1
that converts all its coins into goods in block i and starting
mining blocks after block i − 1 in isolation of the network.
As part of this mining, the attacker mines another transac-
tion t2 that also converts all its coins into goods. The attacker
then waits for the blockchain depth to reach i + k after what
it can collect its goods as a result of transaction t1, then it
publicises its longer chain without t1 so that the chain gets
adopted by the rest of network. t2 gets committed in block j
and after the chain depth reaches j+ k, the peer can collect its
goods for the second time. Note that even if one tries to re-
commit t1 later, the transaction will be invalidated because
the balance is insufficient, however, the double-spending al-
ready occurred.
3.4 Tracking Blockchain Anomalies
Another dramatic aspect of the Blockchain anomaly is that it
goes undetected. More specifically, the Blockchain anomaly
relies on a wrongly committed state of the blockchain. Once
the wrongly committed state gets uncommitted, there is no
way to a posteriori observe this problematic state and to no-
tice that a blockchain anomaly occurred. Although it is possi-
ble to observe that a peer mined several blocks in a row, there
is no way to track down the beneficiaries of the Blockchain
anomaly. This dangerously incentivises participants of the
private chain to leverage the Blockchain anomaly to attack
the chain.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we describe a distributed execution involving
a private chain that results in the Blockchain anomaly.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We deployed a private blockchain system in our local area
network using geth version 1.4.0, which is a Go implementa-
tion of the command line interface for running an Ethereum
node. We setup three machines connected through a 1 Gbps
network, two consisting of miners, p1 and p3, generating
blocks and one consisting of a peer p2 simply submitting
transactions. Peers p1 and p2 consist of 2 machines with 4 ×
AMD Opteron 6378 16-core CPU running at 2.40 GHz with
512 GB DDR3 RAM, each. Peer p3 consists of a machine with
2 × 6-core Intel Xeon E5-260 running at 2.1 GHz with 32 GB
DDR3 RAM.
We artificially created a network delay by transiently an-
nihilating connection points between machines. Note that
such artificial delays could be reproduced by simply unplug-
ging an ethernet cable connecting a computer to the com-
pany network and does not require an employee to access
physically a switch room.
Also, we made sure p3 would mine faster than p1, by
mining with the 24 hardware threads of p3 and a single hard-
ware thread of p1. The same speed difference could be ob-
tained between a loaded server and a server that does run
any other service besides mining. Note that hardware char-
acteristics may also help one machine mine faster than the
rest of a private chain network. For example, a machine
equipped with an AMD Radeon R9 290X would mine faster
in Ethereum than a pool of 25 machines, each of them mining
with an Intel Core i7.
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ti transaction ti submitted to pool ti block mined with transaction tii i mined blocks
1
Figure 4: Execution scenario leading to the Blockchain anomaly: p3 mines a longer chain than p1 without including t1 and
without disseminating new blocks until it forces a reorganisation that imposes t2 to be committed while t1 appears finally
uncommitted
4.2 Distributed Execution
The default case of the anomaly occurs with a conditional
transaction. A peer in the system has a condition that it
will only send money if some other peers transferred him
some coins successfully. As mentioned previously, for the
transaction to be committed, there must be at least k blocks
mined after the block containing the transaction. In our ex-
periment, the client only sends coins once the peer owns a
verified amount of coins. The peer performs a transaction t2
only if it was shown by the system that the previous transac-
tion t1 had been committed and the money was successfully
transferred to its wallet.
Figure 4 depicts the distributed execution leading to the
Blockchain anomaly where p1, p2 and p3 exchange informa-
tion about the blockchain whose genesis block is denoted ‘G’.
1. Peer p1 mines a first block after the genesis block
and informs p2 and p3 to update their view of the
blockchain state.
2. Peer p3 mines a second block and informs p1 and p2 of
this new block.
3. A network delay is introduced between peers p1 and
p2 on the one hand, and peer p3 on the other hand.
4. Peer p1 submits transaction t1 and informs p2 but fails
to inform p3 due to the network delay. In the mean-
time, peer p3 starts mining a long series of 30 blocks.
5. Peer p1 mines a block that includes transaction t1 and
mines 12 subsequent blocks; p1 then informs p2 but not
p3 due to the network delay.
6. Peer p2 receives the notification from p1 that t1 is com-
mitted because its block and k subsequent blocks are
mined; then p2 decides to submit transaction t2 that
should only execute after t1.
7. The network becomes responsive and p3 who receives
the information that t2 is submitted, mined t2 in a block
along with 12 subsequent blocks.
8. Once peers p1 and p2 receive from p3 the longest chain
of 45 blocks, they adopt this chain, discarding or post-
poning the blocks that were at indices 2 to 15, including
the transaction t1, of their chain.
9. All peers agree on the final chain of 45 blocks in which
t2 is committed and where t1 is finally not committed
before t2.
This execution results in a violation of the conditional
property of transaction t2 stating that t2 should only execute
if t1 executed first. This violation occurred because transac-
tion t1 had been included in one chain, decided and agreed
by two of the participants, it was then changed after the mes-
sage of the third participant was finally delivered to the rest
of the network.
4.3 Automating the Reproduction of the
Anomaly
To illustrate the anomaly, we wrote a script that automated
the execution depicted in Figure 4. Figure 5 represents
the execution of a script that execute 8 iterations of the
Blockchain anomaly over a period of 50 minutes. Again the
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Figure 5: Automated executions of the Blockchain
anomalies over a period of 50 min, the execution is
non-determinstic due to the randomness of the mining
process and the network delay between peers
goal is to wait until t1 gets committed before issuing t2 that
ends up being committed while t1 does not appear to be.
Note that this is similar to Figure 3 except that t2 is not nec-
essarily included at the index t1 occupied initially. In par-
ticular, the block in which t2 gets included varies from one
iteration to another due to the non-determinism of the ex-
ecution as indicated by the curve with square points. This
non-determinism is explained by the randomness of the min-
ing process and the latency of the network that also impacts
the time it takes for the consensus to terminate (curve with
triangle points) in each iteration of the experiment. Note that
we use k = 11 in this experiment, making sure that 12 blocks
were successfully mined, as recommended since the release
of Ethereum 1.3.5 Homestead, for the consensus to termi-
nate.
As expected, in each of these eight cases we observed the
Blockchain anomaly: even though t2 was issued after t1 was
successfully observed as committed, if the messages get suc-
cessfully delivered, then the reorganisation results in t2 be-
ing committed while t1 is not. Finally, we can observe that
the time to disseminate a committed transaction to all the
peers of the network is much shorter than the termination
delay. This is due to the time needed to mine a block, which
is significantly larger than the latency of our network.
4.4 Swap Frequency with Different Mining
Difficulties
In the previous experiment, we used the default Ethereum
difficulty (0x400) and automated the execution with a precise
script. To better understand the cause of the anomaly we
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Figure 6: The proportion of transaction swaps observed
does not depend on the difficulty, as opposed to the
consensus termination that increases with the difficulty
tried reproducing the anomaly by hand (without the script)
with larger difficulties.
Figure 6 depicts the average number of blockchain
anomalies leading to a swap (where both t2 and t1 are even-
tually committed in reverse order) occurring in our private
chain for 6 different mining difficulties. Each bar results from
the average number of anomalies observed during 6 manual
runs of the scenario depicted in Figure 4. More precisely,
the figure reports the swap scenarios, where the first trans-
action t1 gets successfully committed before t2 gets issued,
and eventually transactions t1 and t2 appear committed in
reverse order.
We ran this particular experiment with k = 10 for the ter-
mination of consensus, meaning that t1 was mined in block
at index i and it was committed once the chain depth reached
i + 10 blocks. (We presented the anomaly in the case where
k = 11 in Section 4.3.) At first, we thought that the occur-
rence of this Blockchain anomaly was dependent on the dif-
ficulty of mining a block: the faster a block could be mined,
the more likely the anomaly would occur. To validate this,
we varied the mining difficulties from 0x2000 to 0x40000 and
measure the frequency of the Blockchain anomaly over 6 ex-
ecutions for each difficulty value. We observe that there was
no significant correlation between the difficulty and the oc-
currence of the anomaly and that in average we could ob-
serve the swap 6 times out of 10.
We also measured the time it would take for consensus
to terminate in these scenarios (upper curve) and observed,
as expected, that the termination time was proportional to
the difficulty. This is explained by the fact that the difficulty
impacts the time needed to mine a block, which in turn, im-
pacts the time it takes to mine k + 1 blocks for termination.
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1 contract conditionalPayment {
2
3 uint32 paid; // to keep track of the amount paid by Alice when deciding on Bob’s transfer
4 mapping (address => uint256) public balances; // map addresses to their respective balance
5 address A = 0x57ec7927841e2d25aad5f335e3b701369b177392; // the address of Alice’s account
6 address B = 0x5ae58375c89896b09045de349289af9034902905; // the address of Bob’s account
7
8 modifier onlyFrom(address _address) { // enables execution of functions depending on invoker
9 if (msg.sender != _address) throw;
10 _
11 }
12
13 function sendTo(address B, uint32 _amount) onlyFrom(A) { // Alice sends money to Bob
14 if (balances[A] >= _amount) { // checking the sufficiency of funds available
15 balances[A] -= _amount;
16 balances[B] += _amount;
17 paid = _amount; // sorting the amount paid
18 }
19 }
20
21 function sendIfReceived(address C, uint32 _amount) onlyFrom(B) { // Bob sends money to Carole
22 if (paid > _amount) { // only if the previous payment was sufficient
23 balances[B] -= _amount;
24 balances[C] += _amount;
25 } else {
26 throw; // cancel contract execution
27 }
28 }
29 }
Figure 7: A smart contract written in the Solidity programming language to replace transactions prone to the blockchain
anomaly: the sendIfReceived function checks that the transfer from A to B occurred before executing the transfer from
B to C
In addition we report the time it would take for a transaction
in a mined block to be disseminated to all the peers of the
network (bottom curve) and observed that it was not related
to the difficulty. Finally, we observed that having a network
delay greater than the time to mine was foundational to the
observation of the anomaly.
5 Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are a foundational aspect of the Ethereum sys-
tem, as they are distributed code execution based on condi-
tional aspects. The contracts can be programmed to allow for
certain conditions to be met in order for the code to be exe-
cuted. What we found was that the anomaly prevention de-
pended entirely on the programming of the smart contract.
This means that if a smart contract was coded so that it did
not properly check the condition that the first transaction had
occurred, it would execute as normal, acting like a normal
transaction and suffering from the anomaly.
5.1 On-Chain vs. Off-Chain Computation
In Figure 7, we illustrate the writing of a smart con-
tract in the Solidity programming language with which we
could not observe the anomaly. The key point is that the
sendIfReceived function groups two steps: the check that
the amount has been paid at Line 22 and the payment that re-
sults from this successful check at Lines 23 and 24. Because
these two steps are executed on-chain, we know that one has
to be necessarily true for the second to occur.
However, if the two steps were parts of two separate
functions of the contract, one checking that the amount had
been paid and another that would do the payment and be
invoked upon the returned value of the former then the
anomaly could arise. For example, consider Figure 8 where
one function, checkPayment, checks that the payment from
Alice proceeded correctly (Lines 3–7) and the other func-
tion, sendIfReceived, is modified to execute the pay-
ment unconditionally (Lines 9–13). Even if Bob invokes
checkPayment and observes that it returns successfully be-
fore invoking sendIfReceived the anomaly may arise.
The reason is that the check is made off-chain and nothing
guarantees that the payment from Alice was not reorganised
while Bob was checking the result off-line.
To conclude, it looks like the former contract in Fig-
ure 7 has higher chances of not suffering from the Blockchain
anomaly than the smart contract of Figure 8 as it executes
the check and the conditional transfer on-chain, however,
this does not guarantee that the smart contract of Figure 7
is immune to the blockchain anomaly. Further investigation
is needed to prove it formally. In addition and just like trans-
actions, smart contracts must be included in a block that gets
mined and appended to the blockchain. Its inclusion into the
blockchain even with k subsequent blocks may suffer from a
reordering as well, and lead to other kind of anomalies.
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1 contract problematicConditionalPayment {
2 ...
3 function checkPayment(address B, uint32 _amount) onlyFrom(B) constant returns (bool result) {
4 if (paid > _amount) { // check that Alice paid
5 return true;
6 } else throw;
7 }
8
9 function sendIfReceived(address C, uint32 _amount) onlyFrom(B) { // Bob sends money to Carole
10 balances[B] -= _amount;
11 balances[C] += _amount;
12 }
13 }
Figure 8: Executing the transfer to Carole in a separate function may suffer from the Blockchain anomaly
5.2 Multisignatures and the Case of Bitcoin
Even without the Turing-complete scripting language, there
may be ways in Bitcoin to bypass the Blockchain anomaly.
The idea is to change a conditional transaction into a joint
payment that includes both the conditional transaction and
the action enabling its condition. The idea of including the
transaction and the action is similar to the idea of grouping
in the same contract function SendIfReceived of Figure 7,
the check and the transfer that we described before.
The joint payment will represent the payment of Carole
by both Alice and Bob. The payment will thus take two in-
puts, owned by different people, and give one output. Be-
cause the coins of these two inputs come from different ad-
dresses, the joint payment needs two different signatures.
The joint payment can be achieved with a multisig trans-
action in Bitcoin so that the multisig transaction requires
either two signatures from Alice, Bob and an arbitrator, Don-
ald, in order to execute. If both Alice and Bob sign the trans-
action, then it executes and Carole gets paid. However, if
Alice or Bob refuses to sign, then Donald can help resolving
the transaction by signing. It is important to note that the
semantic of the joint payment differs from the conditional
transaction though: Bob cannot wait until he gets the money
from Alice to choose what to do, whether to pay Carole.
6 Discussion
An interesting aspect of Nakamoto’s consensus is that if the
system is large enough and the mining power is sufficiently
scattered among enough mining pools, then the probability
of having a mining pool mining faster than the other can
be made arbitrarily small. For this reason, the Blockchain
anomaly has a very low chance of occurring in realistic ex-
ecutions of a large-scale permissionless blockchain systems
like Bitcoin or Bitcoin-NG [9]. Recent work has shown, how-
ever, that incentives exist for miners to not disclose the block
they successfully mine in order to waste the mining efforts
of others, making it possible for them to mine a longer chain
of blocks than others. This could potentially lead in turn to
the Blockchain anomaly [10].
The 51-percent attack, where an attacker who controls
more than half of the mining power of the public net-
work can mine blocks faster than others, could lead to the
Blockchain anomaly in a public blockchain system. The at-
tacker can issue a transaction to convert some bitcoins to
withdraw some money. Once the transaction is mined into
a block at index i, then the attacker can fork the blockchain
from index i− 1, hence excluding his transaction, with a new
series of blocks that gets eventually longer than the main
chain. As the longest branch gets adopted, the attacker’s
transaction does not appear in the chain so that, in the end,
the attacker withdrew some money while keeping his coins.
With the same technique, one could easily override the block
containing the transaction from Alice to Bob. The possibil-
ity of such an attack was raised in the context of the Bitcoin
public chain as the mining power was noted as insufficiently
scattered to avoid coalition [10].
One may think that the blockchain anomaly is spe-
cific to proof-of-work as there exist blockchain systems not
based on proof-of-work that would not suffer from this is-
sue because they trade availability for consistency (as dis-
cussed in Section 7). This is the case of some proof-of-
stake blockchain systems, like Tendermint, that guarantees
agreement and validity of consensus deterministically. The
blockchain anomaly however applies even to blockchain sys-
tems based on proof-of-stake. For example, Casper is a
proof-of-stake alternative to the GHOST reorganistion proto-
col used in Ehtereum. It looks like proof-of-stake does not
necessarily solve the problem, as even Casper favours avail-
ability over consistency.6
Another problem raised by Gavin Wood, one of the
founder of Ethereum, indicates that reorganisation can im-
pact the initial order of transactions. This matters in an
execution where two transactions aim at transfering $100
from the same account whose initial balance is only $100 be-
cause only the transaction that is committed first can be ex-
ecuted.7 The Blockchain anomaly is more general than this
problem, in particular the Blockchain anomaly allows con-
flicting transactions to be successfully executed and commit-
ted in two different states of the blockchain. Because the
6http://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/332/
what-is-the-difference-between-casper-and-tendermint/
536.
7https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/08/chain-
reorganisation-depth-expectations/.
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blockchain anomaly is more general, solving the blockchain
anomaly would also solve this problem.
As it is known to be impossible to solve consensus in an
asynchronous system in the presence of failures, researchers
generally consider that a protocol ensures termination or
agreement deterministically but not both. In this paper, we
considered that the blockchain consensus terminates deter-
ministically based on the recommended 6 to 12 mined blocks
of Bitcoin [16] and Ethereum [21] but sometimes failing at
ensuring agreement. Note that other formalisations also con-
sider that termination of Nakamoto’s consensus is determin-
istic and that only its safety property is probabilistic [12], just
like we did. One may argue however that termination is
not guaranteed deterministically but rather probabilistically
and that one can increase the probability of consensus agree-
ment by simply delaying the termination; the characterisa-
tion of Nakamoto’s consensus in Bitcoin-NG adopts this def-
inition [9]. In practice, however, blockchain applications as-
sume consensus termination to provide a responsive service,
as explained in Section 2.3. For example, Vitalik Buterin,
one of the founder of Ethereum, explained that waiting for
12 mined blocks is probably sufficient for the first block to
be irreversible.8 This can be true in large-scale permission-
less system where the mining power is sufficiently scattered
among mining pools, but as the Blockchain anomaly shows,
it is easy to revert it in a private chain context.
7 Related Work
Proof-of-work has been previously compared to Byzantine
fault tolerant protocols [5, 19]. Some of this research [5] fo-
cuses on comparing experimentally Bitcoin against PBFT [4].
The Bitcoin blockchain and the PBFT consensus protocol
were evaluated with nodes scattered at 8 locations around
the world. As one could expect given the difficulty of the
crypto puzzle of Bitcoin, the experiments showed that PBFT
achieves a lower latency and a higher throughput than Bit-
coin in serving transactions. However, PBFT suffers from
scalability limitations and the authors recommend using
sharding to avoid having to scale to hundreds of nodes.
Another part of this research [19] discusses the proba-
bilistic guarantees of proof-of-work systems and the deter-
ministic guarantees of Byzantine fault tolerance. The proof-
of-work consensus is compared to Byzantine agreement pro-
tocols along two axes, scalability and performance, where
proof-of-work consensus protocols are considered as scal-
able but inefficient while Byzantine agreement protocols are
considered as efficient but not scalable. For example, Bitcoin
scales beyond 1000 nodes while achieving a performance
lower than 100 transactions per second with a high latency,
whereas standard Byzantine fault tolerant protocols achieve
more than 10,000 transactions per second but scale only to
tens of nodes.
Some solutions immune to the Blockchain anomaly also
exist. PeerCensus [6] was proposed as an algorithm with two
8http://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/183/how-
should-i-handle-blockchain-forks-in-my-dapp/203#203.
components: one to execute a Byzantine agreement protocol
on top of Bitcoin with a simple voting system and another
to minimise the effect of Sybil attacks during these votes.
The latter component makes it difficult for an attacker to
create multiple identities so as to outnumber the votes with
its own votes. Using this technique PeerCensus strengthens
the guarantees of Bitcoin and resolves immediately the forks,
hence avoiding the Blockchain anomaly.
Tendermint9 is a blockchain system building upon proof-
of-stake. It is known to favour consistency over availability,
taking the opposite view of Casper, the proof-of-stake alter-
native to the GHOST protocol. The Tendermint consensus
protocol builds upon the Byzantine agreement protocol with
authentication [7] and requires strictly more than two third
of correct processes to ensure agreement and validity deter-
ministically and to guarantee termination when the network
stabilises and messages between non-faulty nodes get deliv-
ered.
Although the Paxos anomaly was not considered a prob-
lem in the original design of Paxos [15], this scenario was
informally stated as an anomaly during the design of the
Zookeeper distributed coordination service [14], due to the
engineers needing to implement conditional concurrent re-
quests: Zookeeper organises nodes into a tree structure and
it was desirable for the additions of a parent node and its
child to be made concurrent. The child addition depended
naturally on the success of the parent addition. Note that
for other applications that do not need concurrent depen-
dent requests Paxos is sufficient [13]. The Paxos anomaly
differs from the Blockchain anomaly because it can occur on
two transactions issued by the same client. In Blockchain
systems, a timestamp can be used to order the transactions
issued by the same client. Another major difference between
the Paxos and the Blockchain anomalies is that if consensus
is reached, the index of the decision cannot change while the
Blockchain anomaly precisely stems from the fact that the in-
dex of a decided transaction, or the order of its block in the
chain, can change.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents the Blockchain anomaly. Named af-
ter the Paxos anomaly, it prevents a user of mainstream
blockchain systems from executing a conditional transaction,
a transaction that should only execute in the current observ-
able committed state or a later state of the system. Our ex-
perience of the use of an Ethereum private chain at NICTA/-
Data61 revealed the easiness of reproducing the anomaly by
reordering transactions after they had been committed. A
possible way to avoid the anomaly could be to write smart
contracts rather than transactions, yet it adds to the level of
complexity.
Our conclusion is that blockchain systems are difficult to
use properly. This observation should discourage users from
using blockchain systems unless they fully understand the
underlying design principles and the guarantees they offer.
9http://tendermint.com.
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If we combine the facts that blockchain applications require
consensus to terminate fast while the underlying blockchain
protocols guarantee agreement probabilistically then we can
obtain dramatic results when applied to private chains.
Besides the prominent blockchain systems we have dis-
cussed, namely Bitcoin and Ethereum, there exist many al-
ternatives. Exploring the alternatives that exclusively offer
deterministic guarantees for private chain are part of future
work.
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